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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Yel'tsin away while Chechen campaign intensifies  
Does it strike anyone else as odd that President Yel'tsin is vacationing on the 
Black Sea shore while his military is bombing refugees? At least before he left 
Moscow, Yel'tsin broke his public silence over the attack on Chechnya, referring 
to the region as "the center of international terrorism." (ITAR-TASS, 27 Oct 99; 
via nexis) 
 
Is international terrorism really what is at issue here? Now that the extent of the 
operation and the planning it required reveals the military's obvious intention to 
attempt, once again, to subjugate this rebellious region, does this not give lie to 
the justification of the attack as an ad hoc response to fatal bombings within 
Russia? Should Yel'tsin be compelled to explain the true nature of this 
campaign? Or does the fact that this onslaught has popular support immunize 
the administration from providing a credible account of its military plans, as well 
as the evidence of Chechen responsibility for the terrorist bombings that so 
radicalized public opinion? 
 
President Yel'tsin's actions at the initial stages of this Chechen campaign so 
closely mirror his response to the 1994-96 war that, despite serious concerns as 
to the state of his physical and mental health, the thought arises that Yel'tsin may 
indeed be crazy like a fox. Aside from the early disappearing act, the president 
has also this time, as with the last, placed responsibility with a member of his 
administration, in this case the prime minister, whom he then quickly undermines. 
In this instance, Yel'tsin's choice to hold a meeting with his security chiefs, 
without Putin present, sparked immediate rumors of Putin's imminent dismissal. 
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Bolstering the rumors were comments from the Kremlin that Yel'tsin may not 
really view Putin as his successor. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 26 Oct 99; via nexis) 
This tactic, of course, allows the Kremlin to deflect attention from corruption 
allegations by waging a popular war (a war which is not overly identified with the 
president) while providing a built-in scapegoat should the war effort lose public 
support. 
 
Apparat attacks 
After a deliberate snub of the president, Yevgeni Primakov joined with the other 
leaders of Fatherland-All Russia (OVR), Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and St. 
Petersburg Mayor Vladimir Yakovlev, in an appeal to Yel'tsin to reassert his 
political will. Primakov, who publicly refused to meet with his former boss in 
protest over Kremlin policy, signed a widely distributed letter calling on the 
president to remove members of his inner circle who "have effectively taken 
leadership in this country." (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 28 Oct 99; via Johnson's 
Russia List) 
 
Despite Primakov's concerns, the Kremlin apparat has been remarkably inactive 
while the prime minister has taken the lead in the Chechen war. Likely, the 
corruption scandals and financial investigations have played their part in quieting 
the administration's activity, as the apparatchiks quietly look for cover. In any 
event, a former Yel'tsin confidante recently waded back into Kremlin intrigues 
and provided a colorful reminder of an earlier era of apparat schemes.  
 
Former presidential bodyguard Aleksandr Korzhakov claimed at a press 
conference last week that financier and Family insider Boris Berezovsky 
repeatedly asked Korzhakov to arrange the assassination of rival businessman 
Vladimir Gusinsky, as well as Yuri Luzhkov and Iosif Kobzon. (KOMMERSANT-
DAILY, 28 Oct 99; Russian Press Digest, via nexis) Korzhakov's revelation 
inevitably rebounds back on the accuser himself, leading one to wonder just what 
would make Berezovsky think that Korzhakov would entertain such a request? 
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GOVERNMENT 
Mixed messages 
While military operations in Chechnya show signs of careful planning, the 
response in Moscow to significant events suggests either an amateur attempt at 
misinformation or an inexperienced prime minister reacting to conflicting 
information. Vladimir Putin has vacillated between denying reports of Chechen 
civilian casualties and ascribing their origin to the Chechens themselves. Even 
when what little independent reporting exists in Chechnya confirms Russian 
responsibility for civilian deaths, the prime minister refuses to acknowledge the 
military's accountability, let alone remorse. Perhaps, in keeping with the logical 
knots that have characterized the entire Russian justification for this war, if any 
Chechens were killed, they must have been terrorists. In any case, the prime 
minister's conflicting public comments do little to inspire confidence in the current 
Russian government. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
What's good for Moscow... 
Russia spent the better part of the end of October trying to show that what's good 
for Moscow is good for the world. Russia might object to revision of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty for its own reasons, and might be pursuing the war in 
Chechnya to meet its domestic ends. The line from the Russian foreign ministry, 
however, was that each fit into a larger international security agenda. 
 
This line of argument had few takers in the West. On the question of Chechnya, 
European leaders gingerly approached the idea of punishing Russia with 
economic sanctions. Only the United States administration seemed so wedded to 
the arms control apparatus of the Cold War that it was willing to mute its criticism 
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of Moscow's behavior, and thus lend the Russian government the credibility it 
craved. 
 
Presenting the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty -- keystone of world security  
You might have thought the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed in 1972 between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, was a late and minor fillip in a postwar 
order. But, according to Moscow these past few weeks, you would have been 
wrong. In an extraordinarily energetic campaign, Russia's foreign ministry 
attempted to portray the Cold War relic as a critical element of the international 
arms control order. 
 
As it has sought to amend the ABM Treaty, the United States has referred to one 
particular threat -- North Korea. The Clinton administration has wanted 
permission to construct an anti-missile defense to protect Japan from nuclear 
blackmail by the rogue state. Russia, however, refuses to acknowledge the limits 
of US objectives, even while attempting to stymie the specific plan for Japan. 
 
At the United Nations General Assembly, Russian diplomats have sought a non-
binding condemnation of changes to the bilateral treaty (The Jamestown 
Foundation MONITOR, 22 Oct 99), while Russian military officials have made 
bellicose threats to overwhelm US missile defense with more warheads and 
more elusive missiles. (See the comments of first Deputy Defense Minister 
Nikolai Mikhailov, reported in THE WASHINGTON POST, 26 Oct 99.) 
Addressing the French Senate, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov portrayed 
the proposed revisions as evident of the United States' unwillingness to "move to 
disarmament." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 29 Oct 99) 
 
But are the Russians really convinced that the proposed revisions would unravel 
global disarmament efforts? Or are they playing a rhetorical card to bring 
international pressure to bear on the US so as to gain concessions in other 
fields? The wording of Russia's resolution before the UN would suggest the 
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latter. The document, co-sponsored by Belarus and China, specifically complains 
of US efforts to extend an anti-missile shield to a third country 
 
Russia seems aware, in other words, that the small changes the US seeks in the 
1972 treaty are designed to thwart one specific threat -- that is, the danger North 
Korea poses to Japan. Using the language of international disarmament codified 
by Cold War doves, however, Russia has sought to win diplomatic chips for 
future negotiations on other issues. Both the American and Russian diplomats 
have denied a report that, in exchange for ABM revisions, the US has offered to 
help Russia finish a missile radar system at Mishelevka, about 60 miles 
northwest of Irkutsk. (THE NEW YORK TIMES and THE WASHINGTON POST, 
15 Oct 99) Either the deal was never proffered, or the support was too small for 
the Russians, playing for bigger stakes, to accept. 
 
Silencing criticism of the Chechnya operation? 
Kommersant, the Russian political daily, suggested what the Russians were 
really after in exchange for silence on ABM revisions. Say nothing about the 
prosecution of the war in Chechnya, the Russians had offered, and we will drop 
our opposition to ABM revisions, and even support the peace deal you seek in 
the Armenian exclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. (RUSSIAN PRESS DIGEST, 28 Oct 
99; RusData DiaLine, via nexis) 
 
Whether or not such a deal was ever articulated, Russia's diplomats clearly 
struck a nerve in the White House as they lumped Republican rejection of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty together with President Clinton's ideas for 
revising the ABM Treaty. Administration officials long enamored of the concept of 
arms control, such as Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, seemed 
desperate to mitigate Moscow's criticism -- even if it meant muting their own 
reaction to Moscow's adventurism in the Caucasus. In Moscow Talbott 
acknowledged that the Russia has the "right and duty" to protect its citizens from 
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"extremism and terrorism," and merely hoped the Russian government would 
"turn to political levers as soon as possible." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 29 Oct 99) 
 
By contrast, the Chechen campaign appears to have done serious damage to 
Russia's dreams of a greater role in Europe. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin had hoped to step confidently onto the world stage when he appeared at a 
22 October meeting of European Union representatives and Russian officials. 
Putin, Russian officials hoped, would convince European leaders that Russia 
was waging an important war against terrorists in Chechnya and was fit to join a 
new Eurocentric security and economic system. (The Jamestown Foundation 
MONITOR, 25 Oct 99) 
 
The day before the summit opened, however, Russian rockets killed more than a 
hundred Chechens in downtown Dzhokhar (formerly Grozny), inspiring European 
leaders to spend the summit questioning Putin on his nation's military campaign. 
Although the final communique of the EU-Russia summit made references to 
Russian territorial integrity and condemned terrorism, Russia's hopes for the 
OSCE's November summit seemed dashed. Ivanov still called on the Europeans 
to "adopt the charter of European security and sign the adapted Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty" (ITAR-TASS, 1302 GMT, 27 Oct 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
1027, via World News Connection), but there were signs that Western 
governments were consciously downgrading their plans for the conference in 
light of the Chechen war. 
 
Twice in one month? Only for Russia  
Radioactive material has been the source of excitement in Russian relations with 
both North and South Korea. In mid-October, a metal box containing radioactive 
material made its way aboard the Russian cargo ship Ryazan. South Korean port 
officials found the box, which emitted radiation three to four times above 
acceptable levels, among the Ryazan's scrap metal cargo. According to Russian 
officials, they were able to take control of the situation quickly and schedule the 
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material to be unloaded and disposed of at Nakhodka. (ITAR-TASS, 0745 GMT, 
18 Oct 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1018, via World News Connection) Not to be 
outdone, only a week later, ITAR-TASS reported that Russian officials had 
discovered radioactive materials aboard a North Korean train just over the 
Russian border. However, the South Korean paper Yonhap revealed not only 
that there was no radioactive material present, but that the train was actually 
Russian.  
 
Russian and South Korea took these bungles in stride as they successfully 
negotiated a repayment schedule for Russian debts in excess of $1.7 billion. The 
debt -- a holdover from a 1991 loan to the Soviet government -- and Russia's 
inability to repay it on schedule constituted a source of tensions between the 
governments. According to the new terms, Russia will repay the amount over the 
next 15 years, half in raw materials and half in defense materials. (KOREA 
TIMES, 0747 GMT, 25 Oct 1999; FBIS-SOV-1999-1025, via World News 
Connection) However, one important financial issue remains, since the sides did 
not agree on the interest rate of the loan. Still, Russian is already pushing plans 
to supply Korea with a diesel-powered submarine as partial repayment of its 
growing debt. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Goodbye Liberal Democrats, hello Zhirinovsky Bloc 
It has been a roller-coaster couple of weeks for Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). The LDPR has been disqualified 
from running for election to the Duma, having succumbed to the scrutiny of the 
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Central Election Commission (CEC). It seems that, in early October, the CEC 
discovered irregularities in the forms listing the personal assets of numerous 
LDPR candidates. Crucial for the LDPR's future, as it turned out, was that two of 
the top three leaders of the party were affected. By law, the invalidation or 
resignation of just one of the top three names on the party list disqualifies the 
entire party from standing for election. A political party, bloc or movement will 
also be prevented from running if 25 percent or more of the entire list is 
disqualified. 
 
The CEC denied registration to the two LDPR leaders, Krasnoyarsk 
businessman Anatoly Bykov and incumbent State Duma Deputy Musatov, 
because they neglected to include real estate and other assets on their income 
forms. Bykov failed to state that he owned a ramshackle house somewhere and 
Musatov failed to mention that he has three Mercedes. Musatov claimed that one 
had been stolen and the other two were sold, but he could not furnish proof. 
Zhirinovsky's forms also were questioned, but he was able to prove that two cars 
registered to him -- a Volga and a Mercedes -- had been stolen and removed 
from police records.  
 
Predictably, Zhirinovsky announced he would appeal the CEC's decision to the 
courts, but he really could not if he wanted his party to be qualified to run. 
Because all applications had to be submitted by 6:00 p.m. Moscow time on 24 
October , Zhirinovsky did not have time to risk a legal appeal. Instead, he quickly 
renamed his party and replaced those dismissed on his party list. The new 
LDPR, now called the "Zhirinovsky Bloc," managed to submit its application -- 
just under the wire. It is not clear if the LDPR has been disbanded in favor of the 
Zhirinovsky Bloc, or if it is only in stasis until after the elections. (ITAR-TASS, 
1713 GMT, 11 Oct 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1011, via World News Connection) 
 
Central Election Commission continues to register parties 
 9 
At present, as the CEC checks its financial documents, the Communists and 
YABLOKO have lost 9 candidates each, Fatherland-All Russia bloc -- 10, the 
Union of Right Forces -- 12, and Our Home is Russia (NDR) -- 20. NDR is in a 
potentially fatal position; if all 20 (that is, 25 percent of the party's list) are 
deemed ineligible, NDR would be disqualified from running.  
 
The publications of the assets of the country's politicians netted some interesting 
results: Kemerovo Governor Aman Tuleev claims that he owns neither house, 
nor car, nor garage. He does not even have an apartment. Former Secretary of 
the Duma Privatization Committee Sergei Burkov (a member of the Fatherland-
All Russia bloc), who currently works in the State Auditing Commission, did not 
privatize his own apartment. 
 
But just how fair is the CEC? Sergei Stepashin listed that he owned 0.2 hectares 
of land, when in fact it is closer to 2 hectares. Somehow, he was allowed to admit 
and rectify his error without untoward effect on his eligibility. Similarly, Former 
Justice [!] Minister Pavel Krasheninnikov (a member of the Union of Right 
Forces) made a boo-boo and forgot to list one-third of his annual income. He 
explained that he is absentminded; certainly a characteristic any electorate would 
value highly in a legislator. He remained on his party's list. At the same time, the 
actress Yelena Drapenko, a member of the Communist Party, was expelled from 
her the list because she forgot to mention her only car, a beat-up Zhiguli worth 
less than 1,000 rubles.  
 
The publication of this information has embarrassed many powerful denizens of 
the Russian political elite, and threats have been made toward the CEC and its 
members. In response, the government has provided bodyguards to the director 
of the CEC, Aleksander Veshnyakov.  
 
Veshnyakov and his crew have 26 blocs to verify, a task which by law must be 
completed by 4 November. The results will be announced on 7 November. Five 
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blocs and associations have received registration to date: Fatherland-All Russia, 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, YABLOKO, Our Home is Russia, 
and Union of Right Forces.  
 
Still being checked are: the Russian Party for the Protection of Women; the 
Congress of Russian Communities and Yuri Boldyrev's Movement; the 
Conservative Movement of Russia; the Peace and Unity Party; Russian All-
People's Union; Spiritual Heritage; For Civil Dignity; the Party of Pensioners; 
Women of Russia; the Russian Socialist Party; the Movement in Support of the 
Army; Zhirinovsky's Bloc; the Movement of Patriotic Forces-Russian Cause; the 
Bloc of Gen. Nikolaev and Academician Fedorov; The Savior; Unity; the National 
Salvation Front; the Stalin Bloc-for USSR; the Socialist Party of Russia; the 
Peace-Labor-May association; the Communists, Working People of Russia-for 
the Soviet Union association; the Russian Conservative Party of Businessmen; 
the Nur (Light) association; the All-Russian Political Party of People; the Social 
Democrats; the Cedar Ecological Party of Russia. (INTERFAX, 1555 GMT, 24 
Oct 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via nexis) 
 
All hail the CEC for vigilant monitoring of candidates' assets, or not? 
While it is no doubt helpful to have such a watchful group of zealous, and no 
doubt non-biased, public servants on the job, the information at their disposal 
may not be all that trustworthy. It is not too difficult, given the status of Russian 
jurisprudence and law enforcement, to stash, hide, or otherwise squirrel away 
assets in the homes and garages of loved ones so the taxman, or a CEC 
investigation team, will not know they exist. 
 
Even government officials are not immune to suggestions by the powerful. It was 
broadcast on Russian television that Sergei Stepashin owed R13,000 in back 
taxes. Almost immediately, Andrei Pryanishnikov, a spokesman of the Taxes and 
Levies Ministry Press Service, explained that Stepashin in fact does not owe 
back taxes. As a member of the armed forces, he is not required to submit a tax 
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return. However, after claiming that Stepashin was not in arrears, Pryanishnikov 
went further, noting that in any case, Stepashin was credited with a fee for 
teaching at the State Service Academy which he never received. Amazingly 
enough, the fee almost matches Stepashin's supposed tax debt -- R12,500. 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 21 Oct 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1022, via World News 
Connection)  
 
If the elections were held today 
Gennadi Zyuganov's Communist Party of Russia (KPRF) remains the largest 
party with 26 percent support according to a poll taken on 15-19 October; 
however, this does represent a drop from the party's 32 percent support in 
September. The Fatherland-All Russia bloc won 21 percent support, compared to 
22 percent in September. YABLOKO received 11 percent as compared to 12 
percent in September. Sergei Shoigu's Unity bloc showed it could win 5 percent. 
(INTERFAX, 1050 GMT, 22 Oct 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1022, via World News 
Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR James Duke Jr. and Lt. Col. Jill Skelton 
 
New military doctrine codifies first use of nuclear weapons 
Details of Russia's new military doctrine have emerged. Russia's defense 
ministry leadership approved the draft doctrine on 29 September and forwarded it 
to the Russian Security Council and President Boris Yel'tsin for consideration. 
(Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 22 Oct 99) This is the first substantial 
revision of Russia's military doctrine since 1993. The 1993 doctrine was Russia's 
first post-Soviet single source official military doctrine; it acknowledged an end to 
the Cold War, named nuclear weapons as a key deterrent force, and cited 
nationalist and religious wars as primary sources of potential conflict. Those 
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conflicts within the "immediate vicinity" of Russia's borders were considered a 
threat to the federation. (The NIS Observed, 2 Jun 99)  
 
NATO's intervention within the internationally recognized borders of a sovereign 
country, with the airstrikes against Kosovo, has been cited as the motivation 
behind Russia's revision of its military doctrine. NATO's eastward expansion and 
the conflict in the Caucasus have provided additional incentives. Finally, although 
unsaid, upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections are driving politicians 
to proclaim their positions on national security. The authors of the revision 
perceive US world domination as the biggest threat to Russia's security. The 
doctrine lists a wide range of threats to the Russian Federation, from local and 
regional conflicts to a large-scale attack, presumably US-led, from the West. 
(Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 12 Oct 99)  
 
Knowing their conventional forces are ill-equipped to counter US forces, Russia 
believes nuclear weapons are a relatively inexpensive way to maintain military 
parity and its associated political clout against the US. The new doctrine states 
that Russia "retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to ... large 
scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons in situations which are 
critical for the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies." 
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Oct 99, and DEFENSE AND SECURITY, 15 Oct 99; 
via nexis) This statement codifies past rhetoric on first use of nuclear weapons. 
Russia may resort to nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack or 
any situation which they deem to jeopardize their national interests. 
 
However, Russia's nuclear weapons are aging and will require replacement by 
2007 just to maintain warhead levels at the Russian-proposed START-III level of 
1,500 -- well below the 7,274 nuclear warheads Russia declared on 1 July 1999 
under the START-I treaty. (INTERFAX, 1252 GMT, 28 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
0928, via World News Connection, and FACT SHEET, 1 Jul 99, Bureau of Arms 
Control and International Security Affairs, US State Department) Russia is 
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producing one new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the formidable single 
warhead Topol-M (designated SS-27 by the Pentagon). The Topol-M can carry a 
550-kiloton warhead, equivalent to 22 Hiroshima-sized bombs, to a range of 
12,000 kilometers. (DEFENSE AND SECURITY, 20 Oct 1999; via nexis) The 
missile may be silo- or mobile launcher-based, and there are also plans to 
develop a submarine-launched version. Two regiments representing a total of 20 
Topol-M missiles are scheduled to be deployed by December 1999. (INTERFAX, 
0942 GMT, 8 Oct 99; via nexis) Procurement of enough Topol-M missiles over 
the next decade to replace its aging arsenal and maintain nuclear warheads at 
proposed START-III levels will be a daunting task. For example, assuming 35-45 
Topol-M missiles are produced annually at a cost of $40 million each, the annual 
cost of missile procurement alone would be $1.4 billion - $1.8 billion. (The NIS 
Observed, 31 Oct 98) If Russia's year 2000 defense budget allocates 3.5 percent 
GDP for defense (about $5.6 billion), then Topol-M missile procurement would 
account for 21 to 32 percent of Russia's defense budget, a huge commitment. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1151 GMT, 15 Oct 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1015, via World News 
Connection) Even under conservative estimates, procurement and maintenance 
of its strategic forces (missiles, bombers, and submarines) will account for at 
least 25 percent of Russia's defense budget, a very large percentage considering 
the decrepit state of its conventional forces. 
 
Russia's increased reliance on nuclear weapons also explains its visceral 
rejection of any US proposal modifying the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
treaty. The US proposed to amend the ABM treaty in preparation for building a 
National Missile Defense (NMD) system designed to counter the proliferation of 
ballistic missile technology in rogue nations. In an unprecedented act, the US 
reportedly even offered Russia assistance to complete an early warning radar 
station and to share radar technology in exchange for modifying the ABM treaty. 
(Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 21 Oct 99) Russia clearly views NMD as a 
direct threat of its few remaining sources of military and political clout. Russia has 
threatened to deploy additional warheads mounted on independently targeted re-
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entry vehicles, to institute countermeasures, and to renounce all arms control 
treaties. Russia claims the Topol-M is invincible to the proposed US missile 
defense system. The Topol-M's engine design uses a slower burn rate during the 
boost phase, placing the rocket in a lower trajectory which evades space-based 
radar tracking systems. (DEFENSE AND SECURITY, 20 Oct 99; via nexis) 
Russia also boasts it will mix dummy re-entry vehicles with valid nuclear 
warhead-carrying vehicles, challenging US capabilities to identify and track 
incoming missiles. (THE WASHINGTON POST, 26 Oct 99) Finally, Russia may 
operate missiles past their planned service lives. To demonstrate this strategy's 
feasibility, Russia successfully tested a 25-year-old SS-19 ICBM. (Jamestown 
Foundation MONITOR, 21 Oct 99) However, every Russian threat in retaliation 
for the US development of a National Missile Defense system will require 
additional funds for strategic forces which are already siphoning funds from 
poorly maintained and paid conventional forces fighting a war in the Caucasus. 
 
The new military doctrine is related to Russia's new national security concept, 
which states that a US-dominated "unipolar" world is the "fundamental 
international threat" to Russian national security. Russia advocates a more 
"multipolar" world, the catch phrase that has become a key military and 
diplomatic policy goal. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 12 Oct 99) In light of 
budgetary constraints it will be interesting to monitor how well Russia follows 
through on its rhetoric. However, Russia's growing partnership with China shows 
it is already using diplomacy in an effort to turn world opinion against the US. The 
military doctrine's nuclear weapons policy demonstrates Russia's intoxication 
with being a player in international affairs and its determination to use whatever 
means necessary to achieve its national security agenda.  
 
A busy month for Russian weapons salesmen 
In an effort to keep Russia's debt-ridden military-industrial complex afloat, 
Russian officials continue to pursue aggressively any and all opportunities for 
potential weapons sales. The goal is to meet the urgent need for a ready and 
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continuous flow of cash to keep weapons manufacturers afloat and, by 
accomplishing this, ultimately to provide up-to-date armaments to the country's 
armed forces. Russian arms dealers are beating the bushes hard. For example: 
 
-- Falling in line with recent public acknowledgments of warming Russian-
Chinese relations, Russia is expected to sign a contract for the sale of up to 20 
Su-27UB trainer aircraft to China at a cost of $30-35 million apiece. The Chinese 
will use these aircraft as trainers for the Su-27SK and Su-30MKK fighters, also of 
Russian origin. The Su-27SK fighter jets were purchased from Russia with an 
agreement that China would be allowed to manufacture these aircraft under a 
Russian license. A contract for Su-30MKK multi-functional fighter aircraft was 
signed during an August session of a bilateral economic cooperation commission 
in Beijing. Russia is expected to begin delivery of Su-30MKK to China in 2000. 
Unlike the Su-27SK aircraft contract, the Su-30MKK contract does not include a 
manufacturing license. It is estimated that a total of 40 Su-30MKK aircraft will be 
delivered to China. (INTERFAX, 1253 GMT and 1614 GMT, 19 Oct 99; FBIS-
SOV-1999-1019, via World News Connection) 
 
-- Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov reiterated at a press conference on 19 
October Russia's intent to remain Libya's chief partner in military and technical 
cooperation. A Russian delegation traveled to Libya to discuss, as part of a 
bilateral military and technical cooperation commission, the comprehensive 
reform and re-armament of the Libyan army and the upgrade of Soviet-era 
aircraft. Libya delegates also discussed their interest in overhauling Libya's anti-
aircraft systems. According to Klebanov, serious negotiations related to weapons 
sales are expected to begin after Libya determines its further military 
development. The Russian-Libyan commission will convene its next meeting in 
Moscow in mid-November. (INTERFAX, 1640 GMT, 22 Oct 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
1022, via World News Connection)  
 
 16 
-- Finally, according to the Russian ambassador to Syria, Russia stands ready to 
offer Syria "any kind of modern weapon it might want." Ambassador Robert 
Markaryan, speaking at a press conference in Damascus on 19 October, said 
Russia was ready to offer Syria anything it needed in the category of military 
technology. This includes modernization of old Soviet-era military equipment and 
the provision of new defensive weapons. It is estimated that approximately 90 
percent of Syrian military equipment was Soviet-produced. (ITAR-TASS, 0727 
GMT, 20 Oct 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1020, via World News Connection) 
 
Duma takes a stance after repeated reports of crime in the military 
Hearings were held on 21 October in the State Duma on increasing reports of 
criminal activity in the Russian armed forces. Representatives to the hearings 
included deputies and officials from the defense ministry, the Main Military 
Prosecutor's Office, and a number of other departments. After hearing the facts, 
participants described the crime level in the Russian military as "alarming and in 
need of emergency measures." (ITAR-TASS, 0821 GMT, 21 Oct 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-1021, via World News Connection) It is clear that the proportion of crimes 
committed by the military has increased, particularly in the army. Further, much 
of the crime statistics are never reported to state officials. Chief among the types 
of crime include weapons black-marketing, stealing, and assault/abuse (primarily 
related to conscript hazing). Other crimes unique to the military include desertion 
and insubordination.  
 
After the discussions, members of the Duma stated that the most important 
action to be taken at this point was to strengthen state support and improve 
social and legal protection of servicemen and their families. They stressed the 
need to improve the law "On military duty and army service," particularly the 
parts relating to the recruitment of men unsuitable for military service; those with 
health problems and criminal records. In particular, representatives stated the 
need to provide appropriate funding for the armed forces. It was further 
recommended that the Russian prosecutor general should at least once a year 
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verify that state and local bodies are complying with the federal law "On the 
status of servicemen" and that the Main Military Prosecutor's Office should check 
up on compliance with servicemen's legal rights. 
 
The recent reports of increasing crime rates within the Russian armed forces is 
really not new or surprising. Most servicemen, enlisted and officers, are not paid 
for months at a time and have had to resort to alternate sources of income to 
provide for themselves and their families. Some find second jobs; others who are 
more desperate resort to criminal activities. High on this list are stealing and 
selling of weapons to black market arms merchants and others. It is believed that 
at least one source of weapons for the Chechen rebels is, in fact, soldiers at 
various Russian army units. It is also easy to understand the increasing crime 
rates in the context of recent military drafts. Enlistment figures are down and as a 
result the parameters for eligibility have been opened wider. Recruitment boards 
have been accused of drafting men with criminal records, psychological and 
health problems, and low education. (The NIS Observed, 27 Sep 99) This 
amounts to a recipe for serious degradation of the Russian armed forces. 
Increasing criminal activity by soldiers is a sure indicator of the breakdown of 
discipline within the army. Unpaid servicemen must place their focus elsewhere 
to maintain minimum living standards, resulting in divided loyalties. Combine this 
with the reduction in training, adequate housing and benefits, and the Russian 
leadership has a real problem on its hands and will need to take some very 
tangible, aggressive action beyond the passive recommendations adopted by the 
recent Duma hearings. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
CIS "anti-terrorism and free trade zone month" 
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If the CIS should choose themes for the month of October, "anti-terrorism and 
free trade month" would take the prize.  
 
With the war in Chechnya raging, "anti-terrorism" rhetoric was in abundance at 
CIS meetings in October. At its St. Petersburg meeting, the CIS 
Interparliamentary Assembly Council made the unsurprising decision to support 
the international Convention Against Terrorism. (ITAR-TASS, 2009 GMT, 15 Oct 
99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1016, via World News Connection) A week later, the 
Interparliamentary Assembly (IPA) adopted an anti-terrorism document echoing 
the joint resolve expressed at Yalta and Kyiv earlier in October. (The NIS 
Observed, 18 Oct 99) But, without a CIS structure to implement its calls for "joint 
efforts to counter organized crime, international terrorism and aggressive 
separatism," the IPA's suggestions probably will never be implemented.  
 
Elsewhere in the CIS, members of the CIS Customs Union (Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) also voiced their unanimous support of "anti-
terrorism" measures. Meeting in Moscow, the members attached a final section 
to their "Moscow Declaration" condemning "international terrorism and political 
and religious extremism." (ITAR-TASS, 1022 GMT, 26 Oct 99; via nexis)  
 
Just as "multipolarism" has been the catchword in Russian foreign policy, "anti-
terrorism" has become the battle cry behind Russia's dubious efforts in 
Chechnya and possibly elsewhere. CIS members have been quick to jump on 
the anti-terrorism bandwagon, as the statements out of Yalta, Kyiv, St. 
Petersburg, and Moscow reflect, but substantive suggestions for implementation 
have been predictably few in number.  
 
The substantive issue that simultaneously consumed the CIS in October was free 
trade. Despite some agreements on the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) signed in Yalta, 
and further measures adopted by the Interparliamentary Assembly, the FTZ is 
still stymied by Russian unwillingness to implement some of the economic 
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measures adopted in April. (The NIS Observed, 18 Oct 99) Financial strain on 
the Russian economy is part of the problem. According to the Russian Customs 
Committee, Russia will lose around $800 million if it ratifies the 1994 Free Trade 
Agreement and the 1999 protocol on the agreement. Thus, Russia remains the 
major obstacle to a Free Trade Zone document that some, including Yegor 
Stroev, chairman of the IPA and the Russian Federation Council, think will be a 
"durable international legal basis for forming a multilateral free trade regime and 
ensuring that it works." (ITAR-TASS, 0725 GMT, 16 Oct 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
1016, via World News Connection)  
 
For now, the Russian government seems content to rely on the CIS Customs 
Union -- a grouping in which Russia enjoys supremacy -- to carry out its 
economic initiatives. However, even within this group, at least one nation, 
Kyrgyzstan, has pursued its own interests over Russia's by joining the WTO. The 
longer that Russia blocks CIS economic initiatives, the more incentive CIS 
members will have to look for independent solutions to their economic problems, 
thereby circumventing the CIS and Russia's dominance within it. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Natalya, Natalya, where art thou Natalya? 
Despite being touted as President Leonid Kuchma's main rival since the 
beginning of the presidential campaign, Progressive Socialist Party head Natalya 
Vitrenko finished fourth in the presidential poll held on 31 October, behind 
Kuchma, Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko and Socialist Party head 
Oleksandr Moroz. The disappointing finish follows a major erosion of Vitrenko's 
support in the final week of the campaign -- an erosion which curiously followed 
the attempt on her life.  
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While the disconnect between previous polls and the election outcome could be 
attributed to some sort of reaction to that event, as well as to Vitrenko's vitriolic 
statements afterward, the finish is more likely the result of voters' unwillingness to 
admit their plans to vote for the Communist Party. Symonenko's finish also 
demonstrates the successful campaigning done by the Communists in the 
Donbas region during the week before the election. 
 
Kuchma undoubtedly gave a sigh of relief when he saw that Symonenko will be 
his second-round opponent. A Communist challenger virtually guarantees that all 
of Western Ukraine, and much of the rest, will vote for Kuchma. Kuchma must be 
pleased that the Kaniv 4 was unable to unite behind Oleksandr Moroz, the only 
candidate who probably had any chance to beat Kuchma in the second round. 
Moroz's third-place finish shows, however, that if the Kaniv 4 had aggressively 
supported him in the last week, he may have beaten Symonenko. However, 
since the alliance -- not surprisingly nor unexpectedly -- self-destructed, we will 
never know. 
 
BELARUS 
Western media ignore quashing of protests 
If a massive protest is held in a foreign country, but no one reports on it, did it 
happen? To the dozens of individuals who received injuries inflicted by police 
officers and security agents during the March for Freedom in Belarus on 17 
October, the protest was real. Of course, the almost 200 people arrested for 
daring to march toward President Lukashenka's residence know that the protest 
happened. And, the 20,000 people who gathered in Minsk -- the most in at least 
one year -- to chant anti-Lukashenka slogans realize that the protest was 
important. But, what about the United States?  
 
 21 
A colleague of this writer chastised recently, "You expect too much from the 
media. They can't report on everything. When something big happens, they cover 
it."  
 
So, was the March for Freedom, attended by 20,000 protesters, resulting in up to 
200 arrests, with dozens of injuries reportedly caused by police, following up on 
the disappearances of several prominent opposition figures, in a country that will 
likely border NATO, and dealing with a proposed union involving Russia, "big"? 
Apparently not. 
 
After researching coverage of the event, one thing is abundantly clear -- in terms 
of most of the United States, the protest did not happen, the tree did not fall. Or, 
if it did, it landed so softly that it was barely audible.  
 
Consider the following: 
-- A search of North American television and radio news broadcast transcripts 
covering the time frame from 17 October to 27 October reveals just four mentions 
of Belarus. Three of those mentions came on National Public Radio, but only two 
of the four dealt with opposition activities. The search, conducted via lexis-nexis, 
included ABC, NBC, Fox, CBC, Canada AM, CNBC, CNN, Newshour with Jim 
Lehrer, Burelle's and local United States stations through the Video Monitoring 
Services of America, among many others. The last mention of Belarus on CNN 
appears to have been on 9 July, and dealt with Chernobyl.  
 
-- An examination of North American newspaper sources located just 11 
mentions of Belarus between 17 October and 27 October. However, only one 
story -- in The Montreal Gazette -- dealt with either the March for Freedom, or the 
desperate times facing opponents of Lukashenka. All other stories dealt with 
either Chernobyl, the ABM treaty or Lukashenka's proposal to unite with Russia 
(which was often implied to be a new development). The New York Times did, 
however, discuss the crackdown on opposition members in an editorial that 
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appeared to run in European editions only, while The Washington Post ran a very 
small blurb in its world news round-up. 
 
-- A search of wire service output around this event located a number of excellent 
stories about opposition activities from AP Worldstream. These stories seem to 
have been largely ignored, however, by the newspapers that reprint them for 
their readers. 
 
This lack of coverage was mirrored by European news sources, although the 
quantity of European coverage was considerably higher, particularly regarding 
wire services. There were over 100 mentions of Belarusian opposition activities 
between 17 October and 27 October in the European news, a majority of those 
coming from Deutsche Press-Agentur and the BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, which reprinted Interfax and ITAR-TASS. Much of the non-wire 
European coverage, in fact, actually came from Russian sources, which 
displayed outrage at the events in Minsk. Nezavisimaya gazeta responded to this 
outrage by criticizing Russian television stations for their open "support" of those 
at the march. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 20 Oct 99; Russian Press Digest, via 
nexis) 
 
Grigori Yavlinsky, head of YABLOKO, responded to both the events in Minsk and 
the attention focused on them in Russia by denouncing Russia's proposed union 
with Belarus, and boycotting Lukashenka's 27 October speech before the Duma. 
"There is no elected president [in Belarus]," Yavlinsky said. "This is a person who 
has usurped this status as a result of an illegal referendum. However, the use of 
force is unacceptable. Talks are needed between the opposition and Lukashenka 
to arrange elections and hold them. Only after that is it possible to discuss 
relations between Russia and Belarus." (RUSSIAN TELEVISION, 1600 GMT, 24 
Oct 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via nexis)  
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Although Yavlinsky's reaction is the minority sentiment in Russia, his response to 
pressure from the media demonstrates what is truly possible, if only the world 
would notice. What if, for example, the world had seen CNN pictures of 
protesters being beaten? Would the tree have fallen any more loudly? 
Undoubtedly, yes. This is not a Russian response couched in terms of 
"terrorism," after all. It is clearly the trampling of freedom, reminiscent of Warsaw 
or Prague. Don't think, either, that Lukashenka did not notice the response of 
Russian television. His head of administration criticized Russian television for its 
"negative role" in the protest aftermath, while his hand-picked House speaker 
bluntly stated, "These events are having an impact on the republic's image. We 
should think of how to avert such events." (ITAR-TASS, 0625 GMT, 18 Oct 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-1018, and ITAR-TASS, 1657 GMT, 20 Oct 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
1020, via World News Connection) Clearly, Lukashenka is at least partially 
vulnerable to foreign media response, if the media would give any.  
 
Chadwick Gore, spokesman for the US government's Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, said, "The lack of coverage of events in Belarus was 
predictable. It just wasn't covered." Gore's commission (better known as the 
Helsinki Commission) released one of the most critical and strongly worded 
statements about the situation. Gore called it "extremely frustrating," but pointed 
out that coverage is generally lacking in America for this type of event "unless 
you hand them [the press] a victim." (Chadwick Gore interview with Tammy 
Lynch, 29 Oct 99) The Helsinki Commission press release and letter to 
Lukashenka are available at <http://www.house.gov/csce/pressrel1.htm>. 
 
That's it! The next time 20,000 people protest, the Belarusian opposition will 
simply have to make sure more victims are available. That would be "big," 
wouldn't it? 
 
MOLDOVA 
Score one for Bulgaria and peace  
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Moldova avoided yet another dispute with one of its minorities this week, when it 
succumbed to Bulgarian demands to leave a county populated largely by Bulgars 
intact. The parliament had announced intentions to restructure its local 
governments by dissolving a number of smaller counties into larger, more 
manageable ones. Although the plan received high marks from international 
organizations for its streamlining effect, it also created high tensions with 
Bulgaria. As reported last year (The NIS Observed, 4 Nov 98), the plan would 
have dissolved the overwhelmingly Bulgarian Taraclia County into the larger 
Cahul, eliminating the Bulgarian majority and with it the influence Bulgarians 
have enjoyed over the region.  
 
This week, the parliament agreed to allow Taraclia County to continue existing, 
raising the number of proposed new counties from 10 to 11. The decision 
eliminates the protests occurring both from within and without Taraclia; the 
Bulgarian ambassador to Moldova was quoted as saying that "human rights" are 
not "an internal issue," and that if the legislature dissolves Taraclia, the Bulgars 
wish to be placed "under Transdniestr or Gagauzian jurisdiction." (BASAPRESS, 
1700 GMT, 20 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-293, via World News Connection) Seems 
that common sense prevailed on this one. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Women and children first 
A report released last week by the leading Russian human rights organization, 
Memorial, shows that Chechen women and children are the primary 
"beneficiaries" of the Russian offensive. Relying on the testimony of indigenous 
witnesses and Memorial observers on the ground in Chechnya and Ingushetia, 
the group documents an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe. (www.hro.org/war) 
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On 7 October, the Russian air force bombed the village Elistazhi. A. N. Mironov, 
the Memorial representative who visited the area on 9-11 October, could not 
identify any buildings or installations that may have been perceived as military in 
character. However, he did find 34 new graves, and while visiting local hospitals, 
spoke with 20 wounded -- only one of whom was an adult male.  
 
Refugees from a Dzhokhar suburb recount a bombardment that demolished two 
buildings and damaged several others on 27 September. When the neighbors 
were able to access the basement, they found six dead bodies: one adult male, 
Ramazan Temirsultanov (33 years old), his mother, his daughter, his friend Liza 
Hadzhinova (21 years old and pregnant) with two children (ages 1.5 and 3).  
 
There has been a profound scarcity of accurate information coming out of 
Chechnya. This is due to the destruction of television stations and other media 
during the early stages of the bombings and the limitations imposed on travel by 
the Russian military command, which has effectively barred humanitarian aid 
workers and journalists from the republic. In this situation we cannot but assume 
the worst: that during a month of bombardment, the Russian air force has 
claimed thousands of casualties, the vast majority of them women and children. 
 
The bombings have prompted at least 200,000 Chechens to flee the republic. 
Not wishing to see them get away, General Shamanov imposed a blockade on 
29 September. The checkpoints along the borders with Dagestan, North Ossetia 
and Stavropol were closed, leaving Ingushetia as the only region accepting 
refugees. (The only other way out of Chechnya is on foot the over snowy 
mountain passes to Georgia. For the strong that route will always be open -- in 
effect if not in law.) In the last week of October the road to Ingushetia was closed 
as well. At this writing, a humanitarian corridor has been opened into Ingushetia, 
but it admits a trickle and will only be open for six days. Although the window was 
opened a little more widely on November 3, it still seems unlikely that the corridor 
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will be able to accommodate the 16 kilometer-long line of people waiting to leave. 
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 1 Nov 99) 
 
Ingushetia's resources were overwhelmed quickly. By the end of October new 
arrivals were living in the open with no shelter, sanitation or health facilities of 
any kind.  
 
The federal government refused to register internally displaced persons (IDPs); 
the one office where they may register is closed. If they are not officially counted 
as IDPs, the government does not have to provide humanitarian assistance or 
find the requisite funds in its budget. In the third week of October, the most 
fortunate among the IDPs were getting rations of bread, flour, and sugar. In some 
regions only 10-20 percent receive any rations at all. Meanwhile the temperature 
has fallen to 3 degrees and the electricity has been turned off.  
 
Genocide? You decide.  
The legal definition of genocide holds that there must be the "intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such" by a) killing 
members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part ...." [The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), in Malcolm N. 
Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge, UK: 1991), p. 197] 
 
If the Russian political and military leaders wished to destroy "terrorists" or 
combatants but preserve the civilian population, why aren't they letting the people 
out of Chechnya? To reiterate, Russian soldiers on the "administrative border" 
are barring the way of a civilian mass stretching over 16 kilometers. If Chechnya 
is part of the Russian Federation, why are Chechens forbidden the right of free 
passage on the territory of their state? The Russian authorities cannot be 
bothered to distinguish between "terrorist," combatant, and civilian. The Chechen 
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people are targeted for bombing as a nation, they are denied services as a 
nation, and they are deported from Russian cities as a nation.  
 
Speaking at the annual conference of the US-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce 
on 26 October, Zbigniew Brzezinski described the Russian policies as posing the 
"possibility of genocide." According to the 1989 census, the Ingush and 
Chechens numbered 1.25 million. The Chechens numbered 735,000. At the rate 
of reproduction documented in the 1989 census, there should be 883,000 
Chechens now. 
 
According to the RFE/RL Watchlist (November 4) about 400,000 Chechens are 
left in Chechnya and about 200,000 are refugees. That amounts to a total of 
600,000. Between 80,000 and 100,000 are estimated to have been killed in the 
first Chechen war and about another 3,000 have been killed to date. (It is to be 
assumed that most of the refugees of the first Chechen war returned home when 
Chechnya regained self-government.) That would bring the total up to 703,000 at 
most. Therefore approximately 180,000 are unaccounted for.  
 
These results are reminiscent of Stalin's effort in 1944 to deport the entire 
Chechen nation to Central Asia. Most historians estimate that, as a result of 
Stalin's deportation policy, the Chechen population declined by 23 percent. [See 
the discussion in John B. Dunlop, RUSSIA CONFRONTS CHECHNYA 
(Cambridge, UK: 1998), pp 70-71.] 
 
What can the US do?  
1) Cut funding to Russia. IMF funding is one obvious place to cut, but the World 
Bank, USAID, and the Export-Import Bank should not escape attention. (In this 
regard, why is the EBRD funding the bypass oil pipeline, after Russia bombed 
the existing pipeline in Chechnya? Is this the best message to send right now?) 
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2) Treat Russian violation of the CFE treaty as abrogation of the treaty. Russia 
has exceeded the number of troops, tanks, etc. according to the (already 
upwardly revised) limits permitted in Chechnya, Georgia and other parts of the 
southern flank area. The US may announce comparable increases in the number 
of NATO personnel and armaments. 
 
3) Reinterpret the status of Chechnya. Checheno-Ingushetia was part of the 
RSFSR. Chechnya declared independence before the Soviet Union collapsed 
and the current Russian Federation was formally recognized. Ingushetia 
peacefully divorced from Chechnya. The result: It is inaccurate to say that 
Chechnya seceded from the Russian Federation -- it has never been a part of the 
RF. Moreover, the ambiguity of its status was recognized in the Khasavyurt 
treaty, which specifies that " The agreement on the fundamentals of relations 
between Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic being determined in 
accordance with generally recognized norms of international law shall be 
reached prior to December 31, 2001." ( IZVESTIA, 3 Sep 96; via ISCIP 
database) 
 
4) Reiterate US support for the independence of the states of the South 
Caucasus and expand existing military aid within the PfP program and on a 
bilateral basis. 
 
ARMENIA  
Apolitical assassination? 
On 27 October five gunmen led by Nairi Hunanian walked into a session of the 
Armenian parliament and shot dead Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisian and 
Parliament Speaker Karen Demirchian along with one minister and five deputies 
of the ruling Unity (Miasnutun) party. (RFE/RL CAUCASUS REPORT, 28 Oct 99) 
The killers gave contradictory and incoherent statements to explain the 
motivations for their actions. At first they claimed it was a coup d'etat. Then they 
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said it was meant to punish the "bloodsucker" Sarkisian, and later explained that 
the killings were a protest against the government's economic policies. 
 
Some have concluded that the attackers were crazy and acted without a political 
motive. That does not seem likely. The gunmen knew exactly whom they would 
kill, they just can't explain why they did so. Their demeanor during over 24 hours 
of crisis was not irrational. They allowed the wounded to be evacuated and let 
journalists leave. They calmly negotiated with the president and members of his 
staff. Finally, they and all of their hostages left the building alive. 
 
If they were not crazy, there must have been a political motive. The effect of the 
assassination is to behead the ruling Unity party, actually a coalition of two 
parties. As a result of the assassination the major force in Armenian politics is 
much weakened. This has ominous implications for the peace agreement, which 
the US has been brokering very aggressively. President Kocharian lacks a 
political party capable of presenting an agreement to the public. So the peace 
process is at least temporarily an indirect victim of the assassination. At present, 
this is all that can be said with any degree of certainty, although there is no 
shortage of possible explanations: 
 
1) From 1991 to 1994, Hunanian was a youth organizer with the Dashnak party, 
which has been linked to terrorist acts in the past. The party has denied any 
current affiliation with him, much less any connection to the assassination. 
Nevertheless, elements from this party, known for its radical stance on Nagorno-
Karabakh, may have wanted to hold out for an even better settlement -- one that 
would make Nagorno-Karabakh independent outright or would not commit 
Armenia to withdrawing from the other occupied territories of Azerbaijan.  
 
2) Some have posed the possibility of Russian intervention to block the resolution 
of the war over Nagorno-Karabakh and the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline. An Israeli commentator, Gideon Remez, suggested the assassination 
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was connected "with Nagorno-Karabkh and with Russian petro-geo-politics." 
(ISRAEL RADIO, 27 Oct 99; via the Turkistan Newsletter) He also noted the 
arrival of four additional MiG-29 planes in Armenia. Similarly, Azerbaijani First 
Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov does not "exclude the possibility that 
this was initiated by outside forces." (REUTERS, 27 Oct 99; via Eurasia 
Geopolitics) In its statement, the Armenian defense ministry charged that "The 
internal and external security of the state is in danger." (IWPR CAUCASUS 
REPORTING SERVICE, 29 Oct 99) 
 
3) A reporter in Yerevan, Mikael Danialian, suggested that the assassins may 
have been acting on behalf of the president, Robert Kocharian, and/or the 
Security Minister, Serj Sarkisian. He went on to speculate that there may have 
been internal collusion. Apparently, to enter the chamber it is not sufficient to 
show a press pass, there must be an additional pass. Only Hunanian, who once 
worked as a journalist, could have had such papers. As Danialian asks, why 
were the others admitted? And why didn't the guards check for guns under their 
long trenchcoats? When they finally surrendered on Thursday, they "reportedly 
did not hand over their pistols until they reached the investigation centre." (IWPR 
CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE, 29 Oct 99) Kocharian and Serj Sarkisian 
are members of the so-called "Karabakh clan" who may have felt threatened by 
the growing power and prestige of the prime minister. These events are not 
entirely new for Armenian politics. As the Jamestown Foundation Monitor 
recounted on 1 November, there have been several high profile political killings 
which "were linked to the shadow economy and/or political intrigues."  
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Under pressure... 
In recent weeks the government of Azerbaijan has come under tremendous 
pressure from at least four sources. To navigate safely between these conflicting 
forces will require every bit of political savvy the government can muster.  
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1) Since the start of hostilities in Chechnya, Russia has intensified its pressure 
on Azerbaijan. Russian military and political spokespersons have repeatedly 
charged Azerbaijan with aiding and abetting terrorists without producing a shred 
of evidence. The Russian ambassador, Aleksander Blokhin, publicly chastised 
the Azeri cleric, Allahshukur Pashazade, who had protested vehemently and 
publicly against the Russian policies in Chechnya. Blokhin is also widely seen as 
responsible for the resignation of Vafa Guluzade, a key former foreign policy aide 
who in the Spring called publicly for Azerbaijan's accession to NATO. 
(AZERBAIJAN BULLETIN, 26 Oct 99) Many interpret Guluzade's resignation as 
a sign that President Geidar Aliev wished to distance himself from the most 
outspoken critic of Russia to placate growing Russian demands.  
 
2) The United States launched a new bout of shuttle diplomacy to reach a 
framework agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh by the Istanbul summit of the 
OSCE -- or in two weeks time. Previous to the Talbott, Sestanovich, and 
Cavanaugh mission which descended on Baku on 26 October, Madeleine 
Albright had written to Aliev to specify that the representatives of Nagorno-
Karabakh must be permitted to participate as a side to the negotiations. 
Azerbaijan has resisted making this concession for several years and prefers to 
negotiate with one Armenian party, rather than two.  
 
Although the terms of the agreement are secret, some details have leaked to the 
media. While defending the plan in a debate with a Dashnak representative, the 
Armenian foreign minister, Vartan Oskanian, let slip that under the deal 
"Nagorno-Karabakh is not fixed as part of Azerbaijan." The enclave would have 
certain features of an independent state including an army, currency and 
constitution. (RFE/RL PRESS REVIEW, 27 Oct 99; via Turkistan Newsletter) At a 
24 October meeting, on the eve of the arrival of the high-level US state 
department delegation, two members of the Azerbaijani Security Council 
tendered their resignations. Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov and Nagorno-
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Karabakh aide Eldar Namazov resigned, citing their opposition to the Karabakh 
settlement. (AZERBAIJAN BULLETIN, 26 Oct 99)  
 
3) Aliev's domestic opposition has protested the US-brokered Karabakh initiative 
with vigor, summoning the largest ever demonstrations in the capital. The 
opposition, composed of several political parties, has proposed an entirely 
unrealistic set of guidelines for the Karabakh talks and has touted the idea of 
setting up a popular resistance movement. (Jamestown Foundation FORTNIGHT 
IN REVIEW, 22 Oct 99)  
 
4) Since the Summer, Iran has been promoting Mahir Javadov, a former member 
of the Azerbaijani interior ministry who fled the country after an unsuccessful 
coup attempt in 1995. (AZERBAIJAN DEMOCRACY MONITOR, Oct 99) With 
Aliev's health declining, Iran fears that the president may be replaced by 
members of the opposition, such as Abulfaz Elchibey, who openly advocate an 
aggressive approach to "reunion" with the Azeris living on the Iranian side of the 
border. Hence, Iran is creating a military bloc and a puppet it can insert if the 
situation in Azerbaijan worsens. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Parliamentary elections fail to meet OSCE standards  
The 1999-2000 election season in Central Asia, which began when Kazakh 
voters went to the polls in October to elect a new parliament, is off to a less than 
auspicious start. Candidates from Kazakhstan's opposition parties complained 
that the government hindered their campaigns and made it difficult for them to 
publicize their platforms. Opposition members also accused the government of 
perpetrating voter fraud and the OSCE reported that poll results in both rounds of 
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parliamentary elections were marred by local officials' meddling in the vote count. 
A handful of opposition candidates did manage to gain positions in the Mazhlis 
(Kazakhstan's lower parliamentary house), but otherwise the Otan Party, whose 
members support President Nursultan Nazarbaev, swept up nearly all of the 47 
seats which were in contention. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 26 Oct 99) In spite of the 
poor rating which the 865 OSCE observers gave the recent Kazakh elections, the 
CIS observers reported no "irregularities" whatsoever in the vote-counting 
process. (INTERFAX, 0734 GMT, 11 Oct 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1011, via World 
News Connection)  
 
The OSCE and the CIS observers' evaluation of the parliamentary elections 
closely parallel their appraisal of last January's presidential poll in Kazakhstan, 
which President Nazarbaev won in a landslide after refusing to allow any 
prominent opposition members to challenge his claim to the presidency. The 
parliamentary elections followed a similar pattern; Aqezhan Qazhegeldyn, leader 
of the People's Republican Party, was not permitted to register as a candidate for 
the Mazhlis and other opposition members were also kept from running. Thus, 
not surprisingly, the two parties which won the lion's share of parliament seats 
were Otan and the Civic Party, both of which support the president and his 
programs (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 27 Oct 99) and will presumably preserve the 
status quo, a state of affairs which the CIS obviously favors in Central Asia. 
Nearly all of the current Central Asian presidents were members of the old 
Communist Party nomenklatura, and all enjoy both CIS and Russian support, 
regardless of the authoritarian measures they use to ensure their victory at the 
polls.  
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Opposition's unity unraveling amid pre-election day tensions  
Serious rifts have developed within the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), brought 
on by a disagreement between three of its top leaders over how to handle the 
Tajik government's obvious reluctance to conduct free, fair and open presidential 
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elections on 6 November. Government officials apparently prevented the 
opposition's presidential nominees from obtaining enough voter signatures to 
register their candidacy officially. The registration deadline was extended twice in 
order to allow the opposition candidates additional time to collect the required 
number of signatures (145,000) but, due to alleged harassment by local officials, 
their efforts to qualify as candidates nonetheless fell short. (Jamestown 
Foundation MONITOR, 13 Oct 99) Consequently, on 10 October the UTO 
leadership announced that its representatives on the Central Electoral and 
Referendum Commission (CERC) were being withdrawn, due to the 
commission's inability to ensure a fair campaign for all the candidates. The 
following day, the three opposition candidates, Dawlat Usmon (currently 
Tajikistan's Minister for Economics and Foreign Economic Relations and member 
of the Islamic Renaissance Party), Sulton Kuvvatov (member of the Iran-based 
Democratic Party of Tajikistan), and Saiffidin Turaev (the Justice Party's 
candidate) called for the elections to be postponed. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 12 Oct 
99) On 12 October, in response to the CERC's refusal to register their candidacy, 
the three opposition nominees held a news conference during which they called 
on Tajikistan's voters, as well as on representatives of the international 
community, to boycott the 6 November presidential elections. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 13 Oct 99)  
 
Over the course of the next five days it became apparent that the UTO's top two 
leaders, Haji Akbar Turajonzoda (deputy leader of the UTO and First Deputy 
Prime Minister of Tajikistan) and Said Abdullo Nuri (chairman of the UTO and of 
the National Reconciliation Commission) held opposite views on how to resolve 
the situation. On 16 October, Mr. Turajonzoda told reporters that, in his opinion, 
postponing the presidential elections could undermine the next president's 
legitimacy. He also stated that the majority of those who sit on the UTO's 
presidium do not support the opposition nominees' demand that the elections be 
rescheduled. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 18 Oct 99) Nonetheless, on 18 October the 
UTO leadership announced that it was withdrawing its representatives to the 
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National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) and suspending its participation in 
that body, to protest the Tajik government's refusal to even discuss the 
opposition's demands. These demands were made public on 15 October and 
they include: granting all of the presidential candidates' parties equal 
representation on the CERC, 75 percent of whose seats are currently occupied 
by President Rahmonov's supporters; replacing the government's 
representatives on the CERC, on the grounds that many of them openly favor 
President Rahmonov over the other presidential candidates; instructing local 
officials to allow the opposition nominees to carry out the process of collecting 
signatures in order to register their candidacy; and finally, calling an emergency 
session of parliament to approve the opposition's proposal that the presidential 
elections be rescheduled. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 19 Oct 99)  
 
On 18 October, the leaders of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) 
ousted Haji Akbar Turajonzoda from his post as the party's co-chairman and 
revoked his membership on the grounds that he had publicly contradicted the 
IRPT leaders' decisions and was not acting in accordance with party policy. 
Meanwhile, Mr. Turajonzoda resigned from his posts as UTO deputy chairman 
and as first deputy prime minister of Tajikistan in order to protest the fact that 
neither he nor other UTO leaders had been consulted in the opposition's 
decisions to withdraw from both the CERC and NRC, as well as to call for a 
postponement of the elections. Mr. Turajonzoda has the support of at least two 
other leading UTO members, Mahmadruzi Iskandarov and Habib Sanginov. 
These three men take the position that the UTO had an at least tacit agreement 
not to present any serious challenges to President Rahmonov's re-election, in 
order to avoid destabilizing Tajikistan's already precarious hold on political 
stability. Mr. Turajonzoda also publicly stated that whether or not the UTO's 
charges against the CERC were valid, opposition leaders should have addressed 
the issue of changing the commission's membership prior to setting a date for the 
presidential elections. Regardless of the opposition's protests, it appears as if the 
elections will take place as scheduled. The Tajik government has made no efforts 
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to address UTO leaders demands, no doubt at least partially due to the rifts 
which have developed within the UTO leadership itself. The UTO can no longer 
present a united front, which significantly lessens its bargaining power with the 
government and also gives President Rahmonov and his supporters the 
opportunity to play the two opposition factions against each other. President 
Rahmonov may also reason that as long as he has some form of support from 
Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, who is arguably one of the most charismatic UTO 
leaders and who commands considerable popular support, he can ignore the 
other UTO leaders' protests.  
 
The international community has thus far given the president little incentive to 
change his tactics; US spokesmen and OSCE officials have urged the UTO and 
the government to resolve their differences and to take steps to ensure free and 
fair elections, but have not defined what the consequences will be if the two sides 
refuse to settle their differences. OSCE officials did state that if the situation does 
not improve, they may reconsider their plans to send a full-scale election 
monitoring team to Tajikistan. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 20 Oct 99) This would seem 
to play right into President Rahmonov's hands. The fairness and legitimacy of 
Tajikistan's first post-war presidential election process is already in grave 
question, fraught with numerous accusations of campaign violations and the Tajik 
government's obvious reluctance to permit a genuine competition to take place. If 
the OSCE does not send a full team of election monitors, President Rahmonov's 
supporters will have unrestrained freedom not only to obstruct the opposition's 
election campaign, but to rig the vote itself. Furthermore, the international 
community's refusal thus far to unequivocally condemn what has become an 
almost farcical election process in Tajikistan and to spell out what President 
Rahmonov's government stands to lose, should the conflict with the opposition 
not be resolved, virtually guarantees that this election will be neither fair nor free. 
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ESTONIA  
Vodka for votes 
Some Kohtla-Jarve residents who lined up to vote in the local elections last 
month received more than the warm glow inherent to participation in the 
democratic process -- many also received a half-liter bottle labeled Finlandia 
Vodka. Onlookers told the Pohjarannik newspaper that on the first day of polling 
a red Lada car drove to a polling station and Russian-speaking young men 
distributed slips of paper with the name of one of the candidates, Svetlana 
Korotkova of the Center Party. After polling, voters received the bottles of vodka 
from the same car. Candidate Korotkova denied any connection with the spirited 
campaign strategy, and termed it "an obvious provocation." (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 13 Oct 99) The tactic proved more time-
consuming than effective, regardless of the origination. The electoral commission 
of the northeastern Ida-Virumaa county annulled the results of the preliminary 
balloting in two Kohtla-Jarve electoral districts; almost 700 people were thus 
required to return to the polling stations to vote. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE 
DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 16 Oct 99)  
 
While Center Party members proclaimed the vodka for votes ploy an intentional 
move to discredit the party, there is some evidence that voters in the northeast 
may not look askance at such questionable behavior: They elected a former KGB 
officer to represent their interests. Vladimir Tomilov, who changed his name to 
Valter Lants shortly before the election, won a seat on the Narva city council. 
Tomilov reportedly was expelled from the Center Party once news of his KGB 
connection came to light, but he was already on the party's ticket. While voters 
could have known about the name change and the KGB connection, they 
apparently were as unbothered by those facts as by reports Tomilov presented 
false data when filing his candidacy: State law requires election candidates to 
avow that they had not collaborated with the security bodies of countries which 
 38 
occupied Estonia. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 21 
Oct 99)  
 
LITHUANIA  
Popular PM resigns over oil deal; Kubilius asked to form government  
The same day the that the government signed the agreement with Williams 
International concerning the privatization of the Mazeikiai Oil refinery, President 
Valdas Adamkus asked MP Andrius Kubilius (deputy speaker of parliament) to 
form a government. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 30 Oct 99; via nexis) Negotiations with 
Williams had led to the departure of the highly popular PM Rolandas Paksas, 
who announced his refusal to sign agreements with Williams during a nationally 
televised speech on 18 October. The following day, after a majority of the 
government voted to approve the agreement, Social Security and Labor Minister 
Irena Degutiene reported that the government had decided to continue 
negotiations. "[W]e have to bargain for the best possible terms for Lithuania," she 
said. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 19 Oct 99) Three 
members of the government voted against the agreement -- Paksas, Economics 
Minister Eugenijus Maldeikis, and Finance Minister Jonas Lionginas. While 
Maldeikis and Lionginas submitted their resignations, Paksas said initially that he 
would not stay. "I am not against Williams, I am not against privatisation, I am for 
beneficial terms," Paksas explained. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 20 Oct 99; via nexis) 
Within days he would change his mind -- he submitted his resignation last week.  
 
Although the government had passed all legislation required by the agreement 
(The NIS Observed, 27 Sep 99), a new stumbling block appeared: Mazeikiai's 
existing debts. Williams has demanded that the state spend US$400 million to 
finance the refinery's debts and supplement its working capital. Williams 
President John Bumgarner seems confused as to the problem facing the 
government, saying his company is not asking for any money from Lithuania. In 
fact, Bumgarner said, according to the investment contract both the Lithuanian 
government and his company must loan Mazeikiai Oil funds in order to keep it in 
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operation and for modernization. "Mazeikiai Oil will pay back these loans, and 
with interest," he said through his press secretary. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE 
DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 21 Oct 99) The real issue is that the two parties are 
approaching the negotiations from vastly different points of departure; Bumgarner 
seems unable to grasp Lithuania's current economic health. While he issues 
assurances that the loans will be repaid, he apparently doesn't comprehend that 
obtaining the money to make the loans in the first place is what worries many in 
parliament and those government officials, intimately aware of the country's fiscal 
standing, who resigned. This will not be the last time that leaders of a former 
Soviet republic, understanding the need to privatize sectors of the economy, run 
into conflict between Western business practices and post-Soviet economic 
realities. 
 
Concern over what effect the debt assumption would have on Lithuania's 
economic standing is not limited to the domestic arena. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) is pressing the country to reduce its fiscal deficit to 2 
percent (from the current 5.8 percent), a goal the country will be unable to reach 
if it covers the shortfall of the refinery. According to the Baltic News Service 
(1300 GMT, 18 Oct 99), Bumgarner met with IMF officials in Washington in an 
attempt to persuade them to change their position regarding Lithuania's debt. 
IMF support is critical on many levels, not least of which would be to obtain 
additional funding -- the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), which is expected to contribute nearly one-third to a syndicate loan for 
the complex, may withdraw if Lithuanian fails to meet IMF requirements. 
Moreover, according to EBRD spokesman Rimantas Purtulis, such a failure 
would also block access to other international lending institutions.  
 
Meanwhile, the Mazeikiai Oil refinery continued to suffer the vagaries of 
dependence upon Russia for oil supplies, facing another shutdown in mid-
October due to a lack of crude oil. The stoppage of supplies, according to then-
director general of the oil complex, Vidmantas Macevicius, was LUKoil's reaction 
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to being precluded from obtaining a large share in Lithuania's oil industry. 
(BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 11 Oct 99) An executive 
of LUKoil, Yuri Storozhev, met with Paksas to discuss the supply issue, and 
promised improved deliveries if the oil refinery were to agree to better prices and 
terms. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 15 Oct 99) 
Mazeikiai Oil is also suffering the vagaries of personnel actions -- Macevicius 
was temporarily suspended from duty for "unsatisfactory work coordination" on 
12 October, only two months after he filled the position; he was replaced by Vita 
Petrosiene, the economic and financial director the refinery, who was appointed 
acting director general. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 
14 Oct 99) 
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